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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the foreign policy of Jimmy Carter and
his Administration in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The study is based on newly declassified documents from the Jimmy Carter Presidential
in Atlanta, Georgia as well as published material by and about Jimmy Carter.
The thesis challenges the popular caricatures of Jimmy Carter, that he was
ineffective in matters of foreign policy and that he was largely concerned with
establishing a legacy as a peacemaker. The thesis contends that Jimmy Carter was a much
more cunning Cold Warrior than his detractors give him credit for and that the shift in
American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union largely credited to Ronald Reagan
actually began with the Carter Administration.
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Chapter One – Introduction
Introduction
During his four years as president, Jimmy Carter witnessed continual upheaval in
the remote country of Afghanistan. For much of his term, Carter’s administration simply
monitored events in the region, as they did not significantly affect American foreign
policy or the country’s interests. Few people in the administration saw Afghanistan as a
place of consequence and even fewer anticipated that it would remain on the world’s
center stage almost three decades later.
As Christmas of 1979 approached, Afghanistan was not foremost in the thoughts
of Jimmy Carter and his administration. Events of December 1979, however, irrevocably
changed Afghanistan’s status when the Soviet Union invaded the small country at its
southern border, beginning a struggle that would last for ten years. The invasion of
Afghanistan would be the issue that forced the United States to reconsider its foreign
policy and rethink the way it fought the Cold War.
This thesis will demonstrate that Carter’s response to events in Afghanistan
suggests that he was a more cunning Cold Warrior than both his critics and supporters
recognize. Furthermore, this thesis will refute the popular caricatures of Carter as either a
naïve leader or an impotent Commander-in-Chief. Finally, this thesis will show that the
final stage of the Cold War began with Carter’s actions and reactions to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, rather than with the words and deeds of his Republican
successors.
Prior to the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan, Carter and previous presidents had
preached détente, seeking a peaceful coexistence between the United States and the
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USSR. Indeed, the cornerstone of Jimmy Carter’s plan for fighting the Cold War was the
SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty that was mired in the Senate as 1979
came to an end. A former warrior, Carter sought peace, a world absent of the tensions
present since the end of the Second World War. He did not see the Soviet Union as an
immediate threat and treated it accordingly, not as an ever-present enemy.
The invasion of Afghanistan changed Carter’s outlook overnight. The Soviet
Union quickly established itself as an imminently dangerous adversary once again. The
United States renewed a more aggressive policy for fighting the Cold War. Gone were
SALT II and other peaceful diplomatic overtures, replaced by harsher rhetoric and
foreign policy that sought to curtail Soviet initiatives. Carter no longer sought to work in
relative harmony with the world’s other superpower.
United States foreign policy underwent a drastic facelift as a result of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Many historians see Ronald Reagan and his henchmen as the
inventors of these changes, some even crediting him as the architect of American victory
in the Cold War. Carter is often incorrectly viewed as the well-meaning but ultimately
weak and ineffective leader Reagan portrayed him as during the campaign of 1980.
Carter lost his bid for re-election largely because voters did not believe he provided the
active leadership America needed to face the future. Reagan was viewed as the cure for
this general feeling of malaise.
Contrary to this common belief, most of the changes credited to Reagan did not
originate from his administration. Jimmy Carter had a full year to alter American foreign
policy in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. He did not idly sit by and watch the United
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States lose ground in the Cold War. By the time Reagan ascended to the presidency,
America’s course had already been charted.

Timeline
Jimmy Carter devoted most of the January 23, 1980 State of the Union address to
the recent Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, calling it “the most serious threat to peace
since the Second World War.” 1 The Soviet offensive was less than a month old although
the United States had indifferently noted the Soviet military presence for much longer.
Afghanistan and its government had undergone a series of upheavals in the years leading
up to the Soviet invasion but the United States hardly lifted a finger in response.
Although events could be traced back infinitely, for practical reasons, they began
in 1973 when Mohammed Zahir Shah, the last Afghan king, was overthrown by his first
cousin and brother-in-law Mohammed Daoud Kahn, who disbanded the monarchy and
declared himself president of Afghanistan. Shah had been in power since 1933 and was
known for bringing relative progress to the country, often placing him at odds with his
religious opposition. He remained overseas, where he was at the time of his overthrow,
until 2002 when he returned with a warm welcome to an Afghanistan controlled by the
United States.
Mohammed Daoud Kahn assumed power in July 1973 and continued the
comparatively progressive tendencies of his deposed cousin. While he did favor
expanded rights for women, he was, on the other hand, ruthless towards both his religious

1

U.S President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1980-81), Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, 194-200.
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and leftist opponents. During his reign, he did not align Afghanistan with either the
United Sates or the USSR, preferring to act strictly in what he considered to be the best
interests of his country.
The leftist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized control of
the Afghanistan government and murdered Mohammed Daoud Kahn on April 27, 1978.
Noor Mohammed Taraki took the reigns of the government. If the United States took
more than a passing interest in the situation, it was to quietly support the religious
fundamentalists that now provided the main opposition to the PDPA.
Taraki tried to enforce leftist reforms on a country not amenable to centralized
government and further social reforms on a country deeply rooted in Islamic culture.
Naturally, he sought the Soviet Union’s help. Purportedly because he could not control
his religious opposition, he was overthrown by his rival, Hafizullah Amin, and allegedly
smothered with a pillow in October 1979.
Amin remained the head of Afghanistan until the Soviet Union invaded in 1979
and killed him on the 27th of December. Known for brutality, Amin rigorously pursued
his opposition. The Soviets supported Amin’s objective but believed he was only
destabilizing the country. The USSR invaded and installed Babrak Karmal as
Afghanistan’s leader. Now the United States could no longer publicly avoid the issue of
Afghanistan.
As the USSR’s chosen leader, Karmal never enjoyed the support of nations
outside of the Soviet Bloc. He, and the Soviets, could never consolidate power within the
country as well, opposed by Islamic fundamentalists and other anti-leftist factions. If it
had not officially started, the civil war that would plague Afghanistan for most of its
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distant future began. Before the Soviet Union withdrew its troops almost a decade later,
one million Afghans were killed, three million disabled, and five million were refugees,
totaling roughly half of the population.
Jimmy Carter condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. His administration
had been willing to let Afghanistan solve its own disputes, tolerating any government as
long as it did not openly align itself with the USSR. Carter was also willing to accept
Soviet activity as long as it did not overtly challenge the newly established détente
between America and the Soviets. The invasion threatened the stability Carter sought,
forcing him to quickly adapt to the rapidly changing reality of the Cold War. His
reactions set the tone for the remainder of the Cold War.

Historiography
The scholarship on Jimmy Carter is naturally limited, as he is less than three
decades removed from office and still occasionally making headlines. Much of the
writing is by journalists and not trained historians, lending it a less objective and more
polarized feel. One way or another, all of Carter’s literary examiners form a strong
opinion of his record, if not his character.
Even less is written on Carter’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The available literature is limited to a few paragraphs or, at best, a few chapters of larger
studies of his presidency or the era in general. What little a writer says about Carter’s
record on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan almost exactly mirrors his or her image of
the president’s larger body of work.
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For starters, many administration insiders have written books on Carter’s
presidency. Naturally, his cabinet members have mostly praise for his efforts, as they
were directly involved in the process. Perhaps the most extensive writer on foreign policy
in the administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, ends his account, Power and Principle:
Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, by cataloging several pages of
Carter’s positive accomplishments and stating, “The list speaks for itself. And it
guarantees that President Carter will be appraised more generously by posterity than he
was by the electorate in 1980.” 2
If Brzezinski faulted Carter for anything, it was his tendency to be a
micromanager. In his memoirs, he says of Carter, “He told me in an icy fashion that I just
want to be involved in everything.” Indeed, many members of the administration echoed
this sentiment, as do historians, who base their judgment on this fact and the vast volume
of paperwork that Carter insisted pass his desk. 3
In his record, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, Carter assumes partial
responsibility for some of his failures, claiming, “There is no doubt that I could have
done some things better.” On the other hand, he blames Congress for its intractability and
special interest groups that hounded Washington and stifled any genuine interest that
fellow politicians had for America’s needs. He claimed, for example, “I found through
bitter experience, however, that any tax proposal – including our welfare and tax reform
packages – attracted to Capitol Hill a pack of powerful and ravenous wolves, determined
to secure for themselves additional benefits at the expense of other Americans. Whenever
2

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 528-529.
3
Ibid., 71.
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tax measures were considered, we found ourselves fortunate if we left Congress with the
same hide we wore in. It was perennial temptation for Congress to pass tax legislation
that was a Christmas tree full of goodies for special interests.” Carter absolves himself of
much of the blame, claiming, “As soon as I left office, the special interests were
successful in implementing proposals far worse than those which had been considered by
Congress while I was President.” 4
As for the less partial scholarship, much of the literature finds little positive in
Carter’s four years as president. The harshest critics characterize Carter as inept, an
outsider who never figured out how to maneuver among the politicians of Washington or
how to lead America. Betty Glad, for example, sees Carter as a failure because he could
not comprehend or provide the “moral direction” America needed. In Jimmy Carter: In
Search of the Great White House, she briefly mentions his inability to “meet the
challenge” of the Soviet invasion. In Jimmy Carter: American Moralist, Kenneth Morris
sees Carter as weak, “best remembered for alerting Americans to their festering malaise,
only to prove incapable of addressing it.” Written at a later date for the purpose of
synthesizing previous writings, Burton Kaufman’s The Presidency of James Earl Carter,
Jr. finds Carter’s harshest critics to be “justified” in their assessment of his
administration. He cites Carter’s actions as the cause of “a mediocre, if not a failed,
presidency.” 5

4

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 88-89, 92.
Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1980), 505, 507; Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1996), 320; Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr. (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1993), 3.

5
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Some writers see Carter as a failure for other reasons. For example, Laurence
Shoup, in The Carter Presidency and Beyond: Power and Politics in the 1980s, cites
Carter’s ties to the Trilateral Commission as having negatively affected his appointments
and, subsequently, his policy. In his classic A People’s History of the United States:
1492-Present, Howard Zinn states, “Carter, despite a few gestures toward black people
and the poor, despite talk of ‘human rights’ abroad, remained within the historic political
boundaries of the American system, protecting corporate wealth and power, maintaining
a huge military machine that drained the national wealth, allying the United States with
right-wing tyrannies abroad.” 6
Many observers who label Carter inept preface their judgment with the notion
that, at least, he deserves credit for his admirable intentions. Despite once claiming that
“Carter never really got a fair shake,” Henry Kissinger claimed in his voluminous
Diplomacy that Carter’s righteousness occasionally threatened his policies. In The Carter
Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy, Donald Spencer sees
Carter as naively utopian but thoroughly lacking any understanding of political reality; he
promised greatness but offered only retreat. Edwin Diamond and Bruce Mazlish come to
a similar conclusion in their psychological study Jimmy Carter: A Character Portrait,
admiring Carter’s moral fiber while deeming it unfit for national leadership. In his work
In the Absence of Power: Governing America, Haynes Johnson admires Carter’s
integrity, acknowledges his failures, and wonders if the task of bringing morality to
politics might have been impossible. Clark Mollenhoff’s The President Who Failed:
6

Laurence Shoup, The Carter Presidency and Beyond: Power and Politics in the 1980s (Palo Alto:
Ramparts Press, 1979); Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present (New York:
HarperPerennial Modern Classics, 2003), 565.
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Carter out of Control views Carter as idealistic in rhetoric but hypocritical in reality,
failing to keep any of his campaign promises. In James Earl Carter: The Man and the
Myth, Peter Meyer sees the same failure to fulfill promises but views Carter as having too
many different and incompatible sides. 7
One author’s analysis sees Carter’s failures as emanating from his methods, not
his character. In Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision
Making, Alexander Moens sees Carter’s failure as resting not in his idealism but in his
decision-making process. He was too limited in his options by the fact that he consulted
only a select group of close associates. 8
Of those who see Carter as a noble failure, some claim history will be kind to him.
In Jimmy Carter, Public Opinion, and the Search for Values, Gregory Domin argues that
Carter favored integrity over expediency in politics and, while this may have made him
immediately unpopular, Carter has gained respect in hindsight and the world is a better
place for his efforts. Douglas Brinkley’s The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s
Journey Beyond the White House sees Carter’s morality as his “greatest strength and
bane,” having produced good and tragic results that Americans will appreciate in
hindsight as Carter continues to work for peace and justice. 9

7

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 772; Donald S. Spencer, The Carter
Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1988), ix; Edwin
Diamond and Bruce Mazlish, Jimmy Carter: A Character Portrait.(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979);
Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power: Governing America (New York: The Viking Press, 1980); Clark
R. Mollenhoff, The President Who Failed: Carter Out of Control (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1980); Peter Meyer, James Earl Carter: The Man and the Myth (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews
and McMeel, 1978).
8
Alexander Moens, Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision Making (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990).
9
Gregory Paul Domin, Jimmy Carter, Public Opinion, and the Search for Values, 1977-1981 (Macon:
Mercer University Press, 2003); Douglas Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey
Beyond the White House (New York: Viking, 1998), 6-7.
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Many historians see Carter’s failure as partially caused by the volatile times in
which he was president. Charles Jones views Carter as a moralist in The Trusteeship
Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress, elected to provide his brand
of leadership in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. Unfortunately for Carter, the
country’s mood shifted and his style was no longer wanted or popular. While recognizing
both positive and negative aspects of his presidency, Erwin Hargrove’s Jimmy Carter as
President: Leadership and the Politics of Public Good sees Carter as the “perfect match”
for the years of his service; any failures of Carter were also a product of the general
American malaise of the time. In “Jimmy Carter: Crisis of Confidence,” Peter Carroll
blames Carter for his hesitant nature but also claims Congress stifled much of his
momentum. 10
Some writers who claim Carter’s failures were a product of his time now see him
in a more favorable light. In Comparing Presidential Behavior: Carter, Reagan, and the
Macho Presidential Style, John Orman says Carter should not be blamed for the
circumstances of his presidency that would have been hard for any president to face. He
should be remembered for his positive achievements, not the failures that were inevitable.
Timothy Maga’s The World of Jimmy Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy, 1977-1981 sees the

10

Charles O. Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Erwin C. Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President:
Leadership and the Politics of Public Good (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 193;
Peter Carroll, “Jimmy Carter: Crisis of Confidence.” In America since 1945, ed. David Bruner and Robert
D. Marcus (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).
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Carter presidency as marked by sincerely bad luck, acknowledging that he did the best he
could. 11
A few writers who dismiss negative aspects of Carter’s record to outside forces
claim that the administration looks better in hindsight. In Jimmy Carter: A
Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Postpresidency, Peter Bourne claims that
outside circumstances defeated Carter and that he receives “little credit for managing
those difficult times and for healing the nation after a period of profound trauma.” Gary
Fink and Hugh Davis Graham make a similar argument in The Carter Presidency: Policy
Choices in the Post-New Deal Era but add that this improvement in public standing is a
product of collective memory. John Dumbrell’s The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation
argues that Carter’s human rights record is vindicated with time, especially after the fall
of the Soviet Union. Brinkley’s The Unfinished Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey
beyond the White House and Robert Gates’ From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s
Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War claim that Carter’s emphasis
on human rights helped end the Cold War, that he was the first president to challenge the
legitimacy of the Soviet’s rule at home and that this encouraged dissidents to eventually
overturn the communist system. In “What’s Important to Remember about Jimmy
Carter,” Martin Walker states, “Americans should recall the steel beneath the gentleness;
the real historical legacy of Jimmy Carter is [as] one of the men who won the Cold
War.” 12

11

John M. Orman, Comparing Presidential Behavior: Carter, Reagan, and the Macho Presidential Style
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Timothy P. Maga, The World of Jimmy Carter: U.S. Foreign Policy,
1977-1981 (West Haven: University of New Haven Press, 1994).
12
Peter G. Bourne, Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Postpresidency (New York:
Scribner, 1997), 7; Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the
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Some writers take the opinion that Carter had decidedly different phases of his
presidency. In The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter, while arguing that
Carter has been unfairly judged “for failing to pull off the impossible,” Herbert
Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky further claim that a marked shift in Carter’s outlook can
be seen after the Iranian hostage crisis and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Jerel Rosati’s
The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and their Impact on
Behavior claims that Carter’s inexperience led to the early naivety and false optimism
that swiftly ended. In Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter
Years, Gaddis Smith, while claiming Carter failed because of bad luck and naivety, sees
the same change in the administration as Rosati, although he claims any alterations in
policy were reluctant and only done out of necessity. 13
The vast majority of historical writing on Carter was published in the immediate
wake of his years in office. Subsequent writing has done nothing to further vindicate or
demonize Carter. He remains either loved or hated, his actions likewise praised or
condemned, his character either celebrated or viewed as a liability. The events of his
presidency are still seen by some as beyond his control. Others see the same events as
evidence of his weakness. As for any shifts in his thinking or actions, a closer
examination of his record shows that Carter came into office with solid beliefs and that
Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency:
A Re-evaluation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Douglas Brinkley, The Unfinished
Presidency: Jimmy Carter’s Journey Beyond the White House (New York: Viking, 1998); Robert Michael
Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold
War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Martin Walker, “What’s Important to Remember about
Jimmy Carter.” Washington Post, National weekly edition, 27 June – 3 July 1994.
13
Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky, The Presidency and Domestic Policies of Jimmy Carter
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 16, 210; Jerel Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global
Community: Beliefs and their Impact on Behavior (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987);
Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1986).
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he did not stray from them despite the volatility of world events and the constant pressure
to act more rashly. And in the end, his quiet resolve impacted America and the world for
much longer than his four years in office, setting the stage for the coming decades. After
all, Carter was never interested in what was politically popular at a given moment. He
sought to create a lasting, better world for Americans and people of all nations.

14
Chapter Two – Actions
A Peacemaker?
Jimmy Carter is most commonly viewed as a peacemaker, despite his graduation
from the United States Naval Academy and subsequent seven years of military service.
While his post-presidential career has arguably been more productive, Carter worked
tirelessly for his visions of world harmony as president. If his four years as head of state
have one distinguishing theme, it was a sincere desire for peace on a global scale. His
most notable achievement in office might very well be the Camp David peace agreement
between Egypt and Israel. Carter certainly believed it was. 14
Carter’s rhetoric sought an absence of conflict, something he believed his
predecessors had unfortunately neglected. This was his intention from the very
beginning. In his Inaugural Address, he stated, “When my time as your President has
ended…I would hope that the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting
peace, based not on weapons of war but on international polices which reflect our own
most precious values.” 15
Carter’s rhetoric did not abandon these values once in office. In an often quoted
speech given at the University of Notre Dame’s 1977 graduation, he stated, “For too
many years we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics
of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We’ve fought fire

14

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), xiv.
U.S President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1977), Jimmy Carter, 1977, 1-4.
15
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with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed,
with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty.” 16
Carter’s foreign policy not only sought the absence of destructive conflict, it
ideally sought to protect the rights of all the world’s citizens. In the same commencement
speech he claimed, “I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is
based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for
humane purposes.” He believed that the United States was the most influential nation on
earth but that this authority came with inherent responsibilities, duties his predecessors
had abandoned. He later explained his views, stating, “There is no more powerful force
for peace than the United States of America – a beacon for freedom and for human rights,
committed to world peace for all, and strong militarily. And out military power today is
second to none on Earth, and as long as I am President and share this commitment of the
American people, the United States will stay this way.” 17
On the other hand, Carter did not seek harmony at any cost. He refused to give up
crucial American interests in the name of peace. While he did not see war as the best
option to secure American welfare, he was not opposed to military action, once stating,
“The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is
adequately prepared to meet either choice.” He further explained his views, “Our country
has been one that does commit itself to the preservation of peace, but peace through
strength, not weakness. That has been our policy. That will still be our policy.” He

16

U.S President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1977), Jimmy Carter, 1977, 954-962.
17
Ibid.; U.S President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of
the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1980-81), Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, 577-579.
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backed up such rhetoric by advocating increased military spending, though he hoped such
a measure would be preventative. 18
If Carter subscribed to a modern version of Theodore Roosevelt’s theory that the
United States must “Speak softly and carry a big stick,” he sincerely hoped the stick
would never be used. Indeed, he displayed a quote by Thomas Jefferson in the Oval
Office that stated, “I have the consolation to reflect that during the period of my
administration not a drop of blood of a single citizen was shed by the sword of war.” His
goal was to be able to say the same as he left office and, except for the eight servicemen
killed during the failed rescue attempt of the American hostages in Iran, he did. 19
In dealing with the Soviet Union, Carter first and foremost sought a peaceful
coexistence with the world’s other superpower. Rather that spewing belligerent rhetoric,
Carter sought a lessening of the seemingly imbedded tensions. The cornerstone of his
efforts was SALT II, negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons.
Indeed Jimmy Carter came to an agreement with his Soviet counterpart, Leonid
Brezhnev, on June 18, 1979. World events would table the agreement before the year’s
end and severely test Jimmy Carter’s commitment to peace.

The Invasion that Changed Everything
In his memoirs, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski claims to have
broken the news of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to Carter. He states, “At 6 p.m. on

18

U.S President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1978), Jimmy Carter, 1978, 1052-1057; U.S
President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1980-81), Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, 111-112.
19
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 604.
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Christmas Day I called the President at Camp David to inform him the Soviets had made
their move… the stalemated relationship became openly antagonistic.” A hot, new battle
in the Cold War had begun. 20
The Carter Administration publicly claimed to have been monitoring events in
Afghanistan since March of 1979 although, in his memoirs, Carter claims it was May of
1979. When asked by the media in March, Carter stated, “We are concerned that the
Soviets might play an excessive role there in trying to interfere with the internal affairs of
Afghanistan.” The administration then watched a steady flow of Soviet military advisers
and other supplemental forces enter the country. Still, Carter later stated, “We did not
anticipate the Soviets’ move into Afghanistan. This is a radical departure from the policy
and actions of the Soviet Union ever since the Second World War.” 21
Perhaps National Security Advisor Brzezinski is best suited to establish a
timeline, as his position expected him to keep Carter informed of world events. He
certainly wrote more extensively on the matter than anyone else in the administration.
Furthermore, based on the available documents and historiography, Brzezinski dominated
the administration’s foreign policy much more than anyone in the State Department, to
include Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who would soon resign from his position.
Brzezinski claims that Carter was aware of the situation from an early date, even stating
that in 1977 Carter was apprised of the situation from an unusual source, the soon to be
deposed Shah of Iran, perhaps acting in his own best interest. In his memoirs, Brzezinski
20

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New
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states, “The Shah was extremely wary of Soviet designs on Afghanistan, and during his
1977 visit to Washington he spent a good portion of the presentation to President Carter
in the Cabinet Room of the White House expounding the shared American-Iranian
interest in protecting Afghanistan’s genuine neutrality. A strong Iran, backed by the
United States, was clearly in a position to make a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan both
more costly and internationally dangerous.” 22
Brzezinski reconstructs a precise timeline for the Soviet buildup and invasion:
“My notes show… that I brought this issue up several times in late March and early
April, and that in early May 1979 I warned the President that the Soviets would be in a
position, if they came to dominate Afghanistan, to promote a separate Baluchistan, which
would give them access to the Indian Ocean while dismembering Pakistan and Iran. I also
reminded the President of Russia’s traditional push to the south, and briefed him
specifically on Moscow’s proposal to Hitler in late 1940 that the Nazis recognize the
Soviet claim to preeminence in the region south of Batum and Baku. The President then
instructed Vance to have the State Department brief all of Afghanistan’s neighbors on the
situation… In April of 1979, I pushed a decision through the SCC [Special Coordination
Committee] to be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve
their country’s independence… On July 23, I warned the President that the Soviets would
probably unseat Prime Minister Amin, since Amin’s Communist terror tactics were
proving counterproductive… By early September, the situation had become sufficiently
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grave for the President to ask me to prepare contingency options in the event of an overt
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.” 23
Newly declassified White House documents reconstruct a similar timeline. The
United States was conscious of Soviet action in Afghanistan more than a year before the
invasion officially started. As early as November 3, 1978 the United States was aware of
the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The mention of this presence to Carter was
little more than a factual statement. 24
The next mention of the Soviet presence came on March 28, 1979. A White
House memorandum said, “Numerous intelligence reports have indicated Soviet support
and assistance for the Afghans in meeting their present internal crisis.” Still, the Carter
Administration expressed little concern. 25
In Afghanistan, Taraki, backed by Moscow, felt he was losing control of his
reign. His fears were well-founded as he had merely half a year left in power. The Soviets
began sending a steadily increasing stream of military advisers, much like the United
States had done in Vietnam under John F. Kennedy. 26
The United States realized early on that the Soviets might feel pressured into
acting by unraveling events in Afghanistan. A report from Brzezinski to Carter that
autumn stated, “If the recent events precipitate a further crisis and if Soviet military
personnel already in the Kabul area prove inadequate in a deteriorating situation,
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Moscow will be faced with the decision it probably prefers to avoid: whether or not to
escalate the level of intervention.” Though they obviously would not condone such an
action, the administration conceded that Moscow might feel backed into a corner and act
militarily if that was the only solution they deemed practical. 27
On September 14, 1979 the administration realized Soviet action might be
forthcoming. A report from CIA Director Stansfield Turner said, “The Soviet leaders may
be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the
Taraki regime and protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan.” The administration knew
what was happening. Given Carter’s reputation as a micromanager, he certainly must
have known all available facts. Perhaps he and his staff merely believed the CIA was
presenting a worst case scenario. Whether the Carter administration believed the news to
be alarmist or not, they were advised of the near inevitability of Soviet action in
Afghanistan to protect their perceived interests. 28
A few days later, the question was asked in the White House, “What Are the
Soviets Doing in Afghanistan?” The answer: “Simply, we don’t know. Speculation is,
however, intriguing. Most likely, the Soviets have just been pushed a big step nearer to
their moment of truth in Afghanistan. In this game of ‘Ten Little Afghans,’ there is now
only one left… Whatever the Soviet role in this, they should be made to look as if they
had a hand in the operation.” Though the thought in some circles was that Soviet action
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was inevitable, the consensus did not expect an imminent invasion. Still, the
administration was advised of the potential for exploiting the situation. 29
Shortly thereafter, the Carter Administration was made aware of possible Soviet
intentions. A CIA report claimed, “Soviet Ambassador Puzanov in Kabul has
acknowledged that President Brezhnev discussed the eventual removal of Amin when he
met with Taraki in Moscow last week.” Amin was the second most powerful politician in
Afghanistan at this point but had designs on still more power. Before Taraki and Moscow
could remove him, Amin struck and assumed control of Afghanistan. Taraki was
smothered with a pillow and the Soviets faced a regime not to their liking. Their presence
in Afghanistan escalated. 30
Reports in October simply confirmed the expanding Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. While the administration did not express public concern over the matter,
they privately kept their eyes on the situation. As time went on, however, events in
Afghanistan took a back seat to the new hostage crisis in Iran. 31
Still, the Carter administration did not completely forget Afghanistan. Realizing
that the situation in Afghanistan might be spinning out of control, an October 4, 1979
report from Brzezinski to Carter stated, “A de facto Soviet military intervention may well
be the case.” 32
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While the United States was not completely idle in responding to the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan, they were not overtly vocal in their objections. According to
press guidance, the White House privately expressed their concerns to the Soviets on
December 11, 1979 through acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher. 33
The Soviets were not listening. They had already committed to action. A
summary of events in Afghanistan distributed to White House staff claimed the Soviets
had made up their minds to invade at least a month in advance. The unclassified report
read, “The final Soviet Politburo-level decision to invade was probably made in late
November or early December. This would have been around the time of the 28
November Central Committee Plenum.” 34
Regardless of the specific timeline, the Carter Administration claimed to have
been fully aware of the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan as it happened. Carter
stated in an interview, “We did have adequate intelligence prior to the Soviet’s action in
Afghanistan. We knew about the degree of their buildup.” Carter even claimed in the
same interview that “deep concerns” were “expressed directly and forcefully to the Soviet
Union,” referring to Christopher’s mission.
Still, the administration did not anticipate a full scale invasion. Carter claimed,
“We did not know ahead of time that they would have a massive invasion of
Afghanistan.” This was not necessarily due to a lapse of intelligence. He stated, “There
was no way to anticipate that they would actually invade Afghanistan.” The
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administration predicted the increasing Soviet buildup but never believed the Soviets
would directly invade Afghanistan. 35
If the Carter administration had been privately concerned with events in
Afghanistan, they did not publicly acknowledge this information. On February 22, 1979,
the administration announced that they were cutting almost all aid to Afghanistan in light
of recent shifts to a more socialist government. This was the only public reference to
Afghanistan in the year before the Soviet invasion and was hardly alarmist as it did not
mention any perceived threat to American interests. 36
The administration first publicly addressed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on
January 2, 1980 although it said little on the matter except that the issue would be
addressed in full in the coming days. The administration’s first tangible reaction to the
invasion came the next day when Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from consideration
in the Senate.
On January 4, 1980, Carter addressed the nation, saying, “Massive Soviet military
forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had
hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union… attempting to conquer the
fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.” Carter explained that the Soviets,
who Brzezinski later accused of being drunk when issuing the order to invade, claimed to
have been invited by the Afghan government to help quell an international threat. Carter
scoffed at the idea, pointing out that the President of Afghanistan, who had supposedly
asked for help, had been assassinated. Carter then explained the importance of
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Afghanistan, saying that the Soviet invasion was a threat to the region’s stabilization and
that the country was “a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world’s oil
supplies.” Carter never claimed that the country was significant on its own, only that it
affected the larger balance of power, literally and symbolically. He concluded by stating,
“History teaches, perhaps, very few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by
the world at great cost is that aggression, unopposed, becomes a contagious disease.” The
case was being made for the American response. 37
In a conversation with Brzezinski, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin claimed
that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan out of necessity and not greed. He stated “that
the Soviets had no intention of moving into Afghanistan but the deteriorating situation
gave them no choice.” To protect their perceived interests, the Soviets believed they had
no other option but to act militarily. In a subsequent letter to the White House, Soviet
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko defended his country’s actions in the face of
American rhetoric, arguing, “It is clear that an approach whereby the US arbitrarily
declares regions of the world thousands of kilometers away from it to be a sphere of its
‘vital interests’ and reduces everything only to securing its own egoistic interests without
wishing to take account of the legitimate interests of others, cannot lead to anything
good.” 38
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Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took a less defensive position in explaining his
country’s action. As Carter stated in an address to the country, a letter he received from
Brezhnev claimed that the government of Afghanistan had requested the Soviet military
presence. Carter had a habit of scrawling his reaction to documents in their margins. Near
Brezhnev’s claim, he sarcastically wrote, “The leaders who ‘requested’ SU presence were
assassinated.” Later in the same letter, Brezhnev reiterated, “I must with all certainty
stress that the change in the Afghanistani government was the result of the Afghanistanis
themselves and only by them. Ask the Afghanistani government itself.” Carter scrawled,
“They’re dead or either new SU puppets.” If Brezhnev was correct and the government of
Afghanistan asked for their help in maintaining control, they were no longer around to
substantiate the claim. If Amin needed the Soviets to protect his rule, events soon ensured
the opposite. 39
Carter was not alone in questioning the Soviet’s reasoning. In a speech to the
United Nations Security Council, America’s UN Ambassador Donald F. McHenry
questioned Brezhnev’s claims, claiming they defied logic. He asked, “Are we to believe
that President Amin invited Soviet troops to come into Afghanistan in order to oversee
his own downfall and his own execution?” 40
While privately harsh, Carter was more diplomatic in his public assessment of
Brezhnev’s claims. A reporter asked him, “Well he is lying, isn’t he, Mr. President?”
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Carter refrained from calling Brezhnev a liar but replied, “He is not telling the facts
accurately, that is correct.” 41
Later in the same interview, he claimed, “My opinion of the Russians has changed
most drastically in the last week, than even the previous two and one-half years before
that,” and “This action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own
opinion of what the Soviets’ ultimate goals are to anything they’ve done in the previous
time I’ve been in office.” Any chance at continued détente had vanished. 42
Still, the Soviet Union continued to justify their presence in Afghanistan by
claiming that they were only countering the United States’ meddling in the country. In
late February, 1980, Brezhnev claimed, “The United States is loudly demanding the
withdrawal of Soviet troops but in fact is doing everything to put off this possibility. It is
continuing and increasing its interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.” The
Soviets pointed to continuing American assistance to anti-communist forces. 43
Regardless of alleged Soviet motives and American provocations, four days after
initially addressing the nation on the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Carter
addressed the country again and unequivocally stated, “The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” He further
stated the case for American intervention by claiming, “There is no doubt that the
Soviet’s move into Afghanistan, if done without any adverse consequences, would have
resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or
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until they acquired control over a major portion of the world’s oil supplies.” The United
States seldom worried about access to such things and perhaps felt threatened that the
Soviet Union might challenge their interests in the future. 44
He stated that the United States had three options. The first was military action
which he saw as inappropriate because it would cause more problems than it solved. The
other options were political and economic responses, which he chose to pursue. He did
not believe his actions would immediately drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. He
simply wanted the Soviets to know that there would necessarily be consequences for their
actions. 45
Carter carefully measured his words for strength when addressing the crisis.
While never employing bellicose language, he nonetheless used firm vocabulary
although, curiously, he called the Soviet invasion an “intervention” in two press releases
in early January, never explaining his choice of vocabulary. 46
His State of the Union Address of January 23, 1980 certainly minced no words.
He repeated the claim that the Soviet invasion was “the most serious threat to the peace
since the Second World War.” When explaining the importance of Afghanistan, he stated
of the greater region, “It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The
Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300
miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which
most of the world’s oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a
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strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle
East oil.” 47
He continued by stating what became known as the Carter Doctrine, “Let our
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United
States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force.” The line in the sand had been drawn although the address later conceded,
“The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our
excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation’s
security.” 48
The concerns regarding the Soviet presence in Afghanistan did not strictly revolve
around oil. Politically, the United States worried about the implications of recent events.
A White House spokesman placed the invasion in the larger context of history, claiming,
“What is at stake in this situation is not just U.S.-Soviet relations or détente between the
East and the West; indeed what is at stake is the rules of international conduct and the
law by which all nations, especially the super powers, have an obligation to live by and to
observe.” 49
Privately, Carter knew that the future of interaction between the two superpowers
was at stake. The United States could not appear weak, certainly not to the Soviets but
also to the rest of the world. In the wake of Vietnam, America’s strength needed to
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appear credible. Brzezinski advised Carter, “Without firm US action, some of these [nonaligned] countries may draw the conclusion that they have no choice over the long run
except to accommodate themselves to Soviet power.” 50
Carter’s rhetoric did not strictly focus on oil and politics as the reason for
American action. He did cite humanitarian concerns for the plans he had proposed and
enacted. Continually juxtaposing an atheist Soviet Union with a deeply religious
Afghanistan, Carter identified with the Moslem cause. He never claimed that the invasion
was meant to be an attack on Islam, but he suggested that it was a de facto assault.
Allying America with the world of Islam, he stated, “We believe that there are no
irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of
Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.” 51
In a later speech, Carter addressed the human rights issue again, speaking of the
invasion’s “appalling inhumanity.” He explained, “The Soviet Union is violating human
standards in the grossest kind of way. Hundreds of Afghan freedom fighters are dying
every week, some in brutal mass executions. Entire villages are being wiped out. More
than 800,000 people have fled the country. Terror tactics, including the use of chemical
weapons, are the trademark of the ruthless attempt to crush Moslem resistance and to
install a Soviet form of peace – a peace of brutal armed suppression” 52
In the weeks following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter’s rhetoric
established that the United States would not tolerate the actions of Moscow. Carter
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spelled out the reasons why the United States and the rest of the world could not accept a
Soviet-dominated Afghanistan. Simultaneously, Carter devised and implemented a plan
of action to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

31
Chapter Three – Reactions
Carter’s Reactions
Regardless of the cause for American alarm, whether it was ideological or
practical, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused marked changes in American foreign
policy. Carter immediately implemented several measures aimed at making the Soviets
rethink their actions.
Carter briefly considered military action against the Soviet Union before
dismissing the idea. He later explained his stance, stating, “I think it’s important for us to
remember that the best way to deal with a question like Afghanistan is not to send
American military forces halfway around the world to fight in a neighboring country,
when the Soviets have millions of troops a few miles away. The best way to address
those kinds of issues is through moderation, strength, political, diplomatic, and economic
means.” Perhaps he also realized that the Soviet Union had more at stake as the situation
was in their own backyard. 53
Indeed, when a similar situation occurred in Czechoslovakia at the end of the
previous decade, when the Soviets used military force to ensure the continuation of
Communist rule, military options were not considered prudent. Still, tough measures
were necessary. Brzezinski recognized that the response must be historically consistent,
warning Carter that, lest he appear weak, he must act similarly and at least as decisively

53

U.S President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. (Washington D.C.: Office of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1980-81), Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, 2265-2566.

32
as Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk after the August 20, 1968 Soviet occupation of
Czechoslovakia. 54
With military action against the Soviet Union not an option and the situation not
an immediate threat to American borders, Carter sought political and economic means
that would create pressure on the Soviets. Believing time to be on America’s side, he
sought conditions that would “be one major step short of war,” a stance firm but not
overly jingoist. 55
First and foremost, Carter sought to isolate the Soviets politically. He denounced
their actions and called on other nations to do the same. In time, the United Nations
joined together to speak against the Soviet invasion.
Carter did not think that rhetoric alone would drive the Soviets out of
Afghanistan, which was the desired American resolution of the situation. Even the
combined voice of the world would not change the course of recent events. He sought
political denunciation to deter any further reckless acts on the part of the Soviets. He
stated, “We are not trying to bring the Soviets to their knees; we are not trying to
humiliate the Soviet Union. We’re trying to let them know that there is a world
condemnation of what they have done. If they, with impunity, can take over this adjacent
country, then my judgment is they’d be much more tempted to take a further step into
Pakistan, Iran, or some adjacent country.” 56
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Carter further compared the situation with World War II, implying that events
might spiral into another World War if not properly handled. While such a comparison
might today look unfounded, Carter considered that the Soviets might be at a similar
stage as Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. He did not know if the invasion was a prelude
to larger war or an end in itself. Either way, he did not want the world’s weakness to
create another disaster. Carter warned, “Winston Churchill once called World War II the
unnecessary war, because the Allies did not stand up to aggression until it was too late.
We cannot allow another such mistake.” 57
Tangibly, this meant not seeking peace without regard to cost. SALT II was
Carter’s cherished hope for the future but he quickly scrapped its outlook, withdrawing
the signed treaty for consideration in the Senate. Although the measure was personally
dear to him, he did not want to bargain with the Soviets regardless of the actions they
took. Such continuation of negotiations would appear as appeasement or conciliation of
power.
Carter’s reactions did not simply mean that current negotiations for peace were
scrapped. It also meant that the posture of war had to be adopted to prevent further Soviet
military excursions. Because of this, Carter sought additional foreign military bases,
specific to the current threat in Afghanistan. America’s military presence was extended
into the Middle East and into the North Indian Ocean.
Carter also reinstituted the Selective Service. He was clear that he did not expect
to implement a draft. Instead, he only sought to make the conditions easier, should the
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situation present itself. He later stated, “We did not need to draft young people to serve in
the armed forces, but it was necessary to register them, so that we could mobilize more
rapidly if the need should arise.” 58
Carter realized that America wasn’t the only country that needed military
strengthening. He specifically feared that the Soviet Union’s next target might be Iran or
Pakistan. Iran was not on friendly terms with the United States so military aid to the
Ayatollah was out of the question. Pakistan was on more solid political ground and
reaped the benefits of American financial and military aid. Carter met with Pakistani
officials on January 12, 1980 to discuss possible options. Pakistani President Mohammed
Zia quickly became an ally.
Carter sought more than political and carefully measured military responses to the
crisis in Afghanistan. He also implemented several economic measures, designed to put
pressure on the Soviet Union. Most controversially, Carter halted grain sales to the
Soviets. All trade in high technology was suspended. He also denied fishing rights to the
Soviets in American waters. Cultural exchanges between the two superpowers were also
restricted.
Carter took heat from both Republicans and Democrats for his economic
embargoes, chiefly the halt on grain sales. Senator Bob Dole stated, “Carter took a poke
at the Soviet bear and knocked out the American farmer.” Presidential hopeful Edward
Kennedy stabbed, “A weak foreign policy can’t be redeemed by suddenly getting tough
on farmers.”
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Perhaps the most visible American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
was the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games held in Moscow. Carter issued an
ultimatum that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan by February 20, 1980 or the
United States would lead a boycott of that summer’s events. Sixty-four teams joined the
United States in the eventual boycott, most notably West Germany, Canada, Japan, and
the People’s Republic of China. Important allies that did participate in Moscow were
Great Britain, France, and Italy.
Jimmy Carter offered an explanation for his request in a letter to Robert Kane,
President of the United Sates Olympic Committee. He stated, “If Soviet troops do not
fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an
unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will.” Sending American
athletes to Moscow would be tantamount to condoning Soviet action in Afghanistan. 59
In a later speech, Carter further explained his reasoning behind his decision to
withdraw the United States from the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. He compared the
Soviets to the Nazi regime of 1936, saying, “It is extremely important that we not in any
way condone Soviet aggression. We must recall the experience of 1936, the year of the
Berlin Olympic games. They were used to inflate the prestige of an ambitious dictator,
Adolf Hitler, to show Germany’s totalitarian strength to the world in the sports arena as it
was being used to cow the world on the banks of the Rhine. The parallel with the site and
timing of the 1980 Olympics is striking.” 60
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All of these tangible and public actions were swiftly taken to counteract the
Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan. Though they met with varying degrees of opposition,
particularly the grain embargo, they were generally accepted by the American public and
fellow politicians in Washington. Their implications were not as unanimously accepted.

Deeper Shifts
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan provoked a clear American reaction
with tangible and predictable responses. Carter enacted several public measures designed
to put the greatest possible amount of pressure on the Soviets to leave Afghanistan
without resorting to war. He had no delusions that the Soviet Union would back down
although that would have been the situation’s ideal solution. Carter simply wanted to
publicly tell the Soviets that there would be consequences for their actions and that
further aggression would also be punished.
Behind the public responses were deeper shifts in American foreign policy,
changes that would remain in place until the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union had
crossed a proverbial line in the sand and forever altered the way in which the world’s two
superpowers would relate to one another.
On the surface, the Carter Doctrine reinforced that America would protect its
interests by military might if necessary. In this case, America’s interest was oil, what
Carter once called the “economic lifeblood of many nations.” On a deeper level, oil was
not the root of the problem. The dilemma was that the Soviet Union was threatening
America’s access to a valuable resource. Even more simply, the Soviet Union had
challenged the tentative coexistence of détente. A buffer had been eliminated and Carter
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would swiftly shift America’s foreign policy to a more active form of containment, a
more aggressive stance found in prior decades. The Cold War quickly rose in
temperature. 61
In spite of Carter’s future claim that “Brzezinski was remarkably sober, concerned
about future relationships with the Soviet Union,” the National Security Advisor did take
a much harder line towards Afghanistan. Brzezinski claimed that the situation “could
become a Soviet Vietnam.” He saw the situation as an opportunity that could shift the
Cold War along similar lines. Afghanistan could trip up the Soviets as events in
Southeast Asia had America. 62
Brzezinski was not alone in this thought. Representative Charles Wilson of Texas
commented, “There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one... I have
a slight obsession with it, because of Vietnam. I thought the Soviets ought to get a dose
of it.” Wilson would later be instrumental in aiding the Afghanistan rebels. 63
Though more tempered at the time, Carter later made the comparison to the
United States’ experience in Southeast Asia, observing, “Their predicament was
becoming reminiscent of the American involvement in Vietnam.” Clearly, those inside
and outside of the administration were thinking of the future implications of the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan and how it could be exploited in the coming years. Perhaps the
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Soviet military machine would be trapped and weakened in Afghanistan and the United
States would thus gain leverage over their rival. 64
While the United States did not overtly commit itself to a military solution to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration did much more than they
publicly acknowledged to curb Soviet aggression. Behind the scenes, the United States
worked to support the Afghan insurgency, engaging in what Brzezinski referred to as
“direct U.S. assistance to the native resistance in Afghanistan in order to bog down the
Soviet army.” 65
The aid, typically credited to Reagan as his administration’s idea, was specifically
intended to frustrate Soviet efforts and may have started before Moscow officially
invaded Afghanistan. Brzezinski later said that United States used early secret operations
in full knowledge that the Soviet reaction could be harsh. He stated, “We didn’t push the
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.” Such
a statement suggests that the Soviets were not as far off the mark as believed by the
Carter administration when they claimed they were forced to act by American actions. 66
Early in the decision-making process, in a memorandum to the President,
Brzezinski rhetorically asked the question, “What is to be done?” His answer: “A. It is
essential that Afghanistani resistance continues. This means more money as well as arms
shipments to the rebels, and some technical advice; B. To make the above possible we
must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels. This will require a review
of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision
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that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation
policy; C. We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels also; D. We should
concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action
campaign to help the rebels.” 67
While many documents on the matter are still classified, concrete evidence of the
United States’ covert aid to the insurgents exists. For example, Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown traveled to China soon after the invasion. He was given a list of points to
discuss. Among other items, Brown was to make clear to the Chinese, “We intend to
supply weapons to the rebels, on a covert basis, although the divided loyalties of the
opposition to the Kabul government and the very large Soviet commitment make it
doubtful that we can force the Soviets out of the country in the short term… It would help
if China could provide arms for the Afghan nationalists and for Pakistan also.” 68
The Soviets claimed that such aid was partially the cause for their invasion. As
early as March 1979, the Soviet press claimed that the United States was involved in the
support of the Afghan insurgency. At the time, Brzezinski advised the White House, “I
have been authoritatively assured that the United States is not involved.” 69
Shortly after the invasion, a White House memorandum reported, “Soviet
television depicts a large cache of allegedly U.S., British, and Chinese orgin [sic] small
arms captured from Afghan insurgents and interviews insurgent prisoners who claim they
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have been trained and equipped over the past three years by U.S. and Chinese officers
operating out of Pakistan.” Obviously, the United States denied involvement. 70
In a 1998 interview, National Security Adviser Brzezinski placed America’s
support of the Afghani rebels as much earlier than the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He
claimed, “According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Moujahedeen began
during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But
the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3,
1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the
pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I
explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military
intervention.” To date, no such directive or note has been declassified. The July 3, 1979
date, however, has been confirmed by other insiders, most notable Robert Gates, who
served on Carter’s National Security Council. 71
Later in the interview, Brzezinski was asked if he had any qualms about the
American action, as it had subsequently brought the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. He
sounded off, “Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect
of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day the
Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, in substance: We now
have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War. Indeed, for almost 10 years,
Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought
about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire… What is most
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important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire?
Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold
War?” This statement was made roughly three years before September 11, 2001. 72
At the time, the United States did not make public any support for the Afghan
insurgency. Predictably, their official position consisted of little more than denials and
refusals to comment.
In an often heated yet comical exchange, White House spokesman Hodding
Carter continually refused to comment about possible aid to the insurgents in
Afghanistan. During a January 7, 1980 daily press briefing, he first spoke on the issue,
saying, “I have no comment on that question,” and, more emphatically, “If you think for
one minute that I’m going to answer ON THE RECORD anything to do with that
question, then you’re wrong.” His answers did not satisfy the press. 73
The next day, when asked about possible moves the United States could make to
assist the insurgency, Hodding Carter balked, finally claiming of such actions, “They
would not be announced from this podium, nor would they be announced while waving
the flags standing on top of the Capitol,” and, “A lot of the things you’re suggesting are
not the kind of things that a President of the United States is going to go waving around
saying he was doing if he were doing them.” His answers still did not satisfy the press. 74
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The next day, he was asked yet again about possible aid to the insurgency and
answered, “I think you can probably ask that a long time and I’ll never have an answer
for that one. There is nothing I have to offer on that subject… I have, in the past, dealt
with that question by saying that I know of no such provision. That’s the best I can do for
you. I don’t have any change in the old guidance.” Still, the question remained. 75
The next day, a member of the press asked about such aid again, suggesting “the
possibility that it’s being done but they aren’t telling you about it.” Hodding Carter’s
response, “(Laughs.) I could hardly argue with the thought that there are a lot of things
that go on in government that I don’t know about… I, personally, am perfectly happy to
deny it… If we did, I wouldn’t say it. It’s not the kind of question I would comment on,
and I am simply not going to go into it at all.” The question still didn’t go away. 76
In February, Hodding Carter had to address the issue of American aid to the
Afghan insurgency once more. He reiterated the same point he had always made and
explained, “Following standard procedure on stories of this kind, I will not be
commenting on allegations of U.S. assistance to the forces in Afghanistan. I would only
observe that a refusal to comment here must not be taken as an excuse for any inferences
about what we are or are not doing. As a matter of policy, I do not comment.” 77
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The issue still did not go away. Later in February, a member of the press asked,
“How can you justify not saying whether the United States is in fact assisting these
groups?” Hodding Carter answered, “We can justify it on the basis of precedence, on the
basis of what we consider to be the best interests of the people of Afghanistan. Because
once you start answering questions that have to do with such activities, a refusal to
answer them in the future is then taken as an implicit admission that ‘something is going
on.’ The only way not to get onto that slope, is not to comment on it at all.” Still, the
press persisted with their interrogations. 78
For his part, Carter denied the existence of American aid to the Afghan
insurgency. When asked in an April 1980 interview, he stated, “That’s a difficult thing
for us to do or to discuss… I don’t think there are any American weapons at all in
Afghanistan. I think there have been a few grenades, I understand, found in Afghanistan,
but those were derived from previous sales made to Iran in years gone by… But I think
the Afghan freedom fighters are doing very well on their own in getting weapons away
from their own previous armed forces and also perhaps some from the Soviet invaders.”
Later he simply refused to comment, saying, “That’s a question I would rather not
answer.” Given his reputation as a micromanager, it is hard to imagine Carter was not
aware of every major covert move the United States considered. 79
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While unable to comment at the time, Carter later admitted that America had a
role in the Afghan insurgency. In his memoirs, Carter addresses the issue, “In a highly
secret move, we also assessed the feasibility of arranging for Soviet-made weapons
(which would appear to have come from the Afghan military forces) to be delivered to
the freedom fighters in Afghanistan and of giving them what encouragement we could to
resist the subjugation by the Soviet invaders.” 80
Carter had no illusions that the Afghan insurgency would immediately expel the
Soviets. They did not have the strength or organization to face a superpower on a
traditional field of battle. However, Carter did believe that the insurgency could hinder
the Soviet Union in the long term. He stated, “If the Afghans could continue their
courageous struggle, the Soviet leaders would have to settle for a long, drawn-out, and
costly war.” 81
The insurgents primarily came from the more fundamentalist Islamic factions of
Afghanistan, perhaps because the Soviet Union sought to oppress all religion or perhaps
because most of the Muslim clergy were wealthy through land holdings that communism
would evaporate. Regardless of the rebels’ motives, the Carter administration did
recognize the potential for categorizing the conflict in terms of religion. A February 4,
1980 report said, “More and more Afghans are talking about a ‘holy war’ against the
Soviets.” The United States quickly adopted rhetoric friendly to the Islamic world. 82
In hindsight, the United States might not have been wise to ally itself with a group
of fighters that would become a regime it would oust little more than twenty years later.
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But American foreign policy has typically been guided by expediency, not genuine
concern for the interests of others, and the rebels were willing to stand up to America’s
chief enemy. Besides, at the time, America had no quarrel with Islamic extremists. The
only parts of the Arab world with which the West squabbled were the leaders of OPEC
who were comparatively secular Moslems.
While the Afghani resistance did not presently have any noticeable negative
associations, America did quickly adopt new partners that did come with baggage. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced Carter to evaluate America’s allies and establish
fresh alliances that were not clear of controversy, mainly with China and Pakistan.
Carter had already attempted to establish a better relationship with China, whose
diplomatic doors had been officially closed from the time communism became the law of
the land until the presidency of Richard Nixon. The Soviet Union’s aggression made
better ties with China even more urgent. Just as Nixon theorized, if China became one of
the United States’ principle allies, the Soviet Union might tremble at the implications, the
balance of power having shifted away from their interests. Already, the two largest
communist nations had an unfriendly rivalry. A further rift might create peace on
America’s terms.
The United States not only sought a cordial political relationship with China, one
that might frustrate the Soviet Union, but also a backdoor for arming the Afghan
insurgency. The United States was reluctant to arm the rebels using normal channels, as
the paper trail would clearly point to their involvement. As the Reagan administration
would do in the Iran-Contra scandal, Carter and his advisers wanted their support to take
a circuitous route.
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On the agenda for Secretary of Defense Brown’s trip to China was a “private
exploration of possibilities for US-PRC cooperation in facilitating support for Afghan
insurgents and steps to bolster the security of Pakistan.” The talks were not made public,
just as America’s support for the Afghan resistance was kept silent. 83
Though the support and cooperation with the Chinese was supposed to be kept
secret, the Soviet Union claimed to be aware of the assistance and collaboration. As early
as January 9, 1980, Pravda claimed that “Secretary Brown and his Chinese hosts have
discussed the possibility of cooperative subversive actions against Afghanistan with
Pakistan having a key role.” Naturally, the White House dismissed the report. 84
China was not merely a pawn in United States foreign policy. No supporters of
the Soviet Union, they were willing cohorts and may have even triggered the partnership
of convenience. As early as October 1979, the Chinese expressed interest in supporting
the Afghan insurgency. A White House memorandum stated, “The ambassador [Zhang,
Chinese, to Thailand] reports that China has no intention of concluding another
friendship treaty with the Soviets and is applying pressure on them by supporting antiSoviet forces in Afghanistan, Africa, and the Middle East.” China had significant interest
in Afghanistan, as they were Soviet rivals as well. 85
The renewed ties with China came at a price. China was known for its poor
human rights record and Carter took much criticism for allying America with such a
country. Many Americans also criticized the president’s policy because they believed the
proper Chinese government was in exile on Formosa. Because of the urgency of the
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situation in Afghanistan, however, Carter was happy to look the other way at human
rights abuses and other criticism.
Brzezinski certainly had no qualms about such backdoor deals with dubious allies.
He later spoke of a similar situation involving American relations with China, “I
encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never
support him but China could.” America “winked semipublicly” as arms made their way
to Pol Pot’s regime to oust the Vietnamese from Cambodia. 86
Unlike the renewed alliance with China, the Carter administration never hid its
military support of Pakistan. While Pakistan’s human rights record was far from spotless,
they were already something of an American ally. Located next to Afghanistan and closer
to the Indian Ocean, the defense of Pakistan had an immediate sense of urgency as well
after the Soviet invasion. Carter never faced overwhelming criticism because of his
support of Pakistan, but he was forced to compromise his principles nonetheless.
While the United States did not have to compromise its ideals by allying itself
with Pakistan as much as it did with China, Carter still conceded his and America’s ideal
interests by turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. The 1976 Symington
Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act forbid the United States from providing all
but the most basic forms of humanitarian aid to countries seeking to develop the
capability for nuclear weapons. Pakistan was on the list of forbidden nations but the
realities of Afghanistan made Carter reconsider America’s position. A White House
report stated, “We believe that we can develop, together with the Congress, a means of
balancing our continuing concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear activities with the urgent
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need to respond, in a clear and credible manner, to the Soviet challenge to peace in
Asia… This is clearly an exceptional circumstance. We remain committed in our
opposition to any proliferation of nuclear devices.” Regardless of the rhetoric, idealism
took a backseat to political reality. 87
White House guidance subsequently publicized that the President would work
with congress to support Pakistan despite their joint concern regarding its nuclear
capability. Carter announced, “In consultation with the Congress, I will be requesting
authority to provide the full range of necessary assistance to Pakistan. This legislative
authority will make an exception to restrictions in existing law that prohibit aid to
Pakistan because of its nuclear activities. We remain firmly committed, as a matter of
profound national interest, to continuing our determined efforts to avoid nuclear weapons
proliferation in that region and elsewhere. But the need to provide concrete support for
Pakistan’s defense is compelling. A strong response to Pakistan’s urgent requirements
will demonstrate to that government that its security can be maintained by conventional
means.” The resolute commitment to prevent nuclear proliferation was traded for
expediency and Pakistan faced few roadblocks on its subsequent route to becoming a
nuclear power. 88
Commenting on the situation, Brzezinski stated in his memoirs, “Although we
succeeded in diverting the world from a scramble for plutonium, we could not control the
serious proliferation risk in Pakistan. Altered strategic realities in southwestern Asia
(Afghanistan and Iran) complicated the problem further. We attempted to solve a
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problem that was unmanageable at best, and the policy has to be judged in that context.”
The Carter administration compromised their principles because it saw such a choice as
the lesser of two evils. 89
And thus Pakistan pursued its nuclear ambitions without fear of reprisal,
expediency having shifted American attitudes towards the country. Pakistan’s President
Zia saw the change for what it was and compared being America’s ally to living by the
shores of a great river. He told subsequent CIA Director William Casey, “The soil is
wonderfully fertile but every four or eight years the river changes course, and you may
find yourself alone in a desert.” 90
The United States did more than simply supply military aid to Pakistan despite
their nuclear ambitions. Pakistan became as necessary a partner as China in supplying the
Afghan resistance. Brzezinski knew the importance of Pakistan to the supply chain that
would eventually aid the Afghan insurgency. He remarked to Carter, “If we can stiffen
Pakistan’s back, we should be in a position to extend some aid to the Afghani rebels, in
order to keep the Soviets bogged down.” Thus began a chain of events that saw American
money spent to purchase Chinese weapons shipped to Pakistan and then to Afghani
freedom fighters who would use them against Soviet troops, a tangled web that would
make the most cynical member of the Reagan administration proud, a convoluted trail
that even Oliver North could not have fathomed. 91
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also forced the Carter administration to make
changes on the domestic front. Typical of Presidents in times of perceived crises, Carter
asked for greater power for his administration to collect intelligence on foreign and
domestic fronts. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, he listed among his solutions to
countering the Soviet Union, “We need to remove unwarranted restraints on America’s
ability to collect intelligence.” 92
From the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to Abraham Lincoln’s Civil War
suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to the present day’s USA PATRIOT Act,
American presidents have often made similar requests and have frequently come under
attack as enemies of the Bill of Rights. Carter, however, made it clear that he did not
want to infringe upon sacred American rights, qualifying his statement by later saying,
“While protecting the constitutional rights of Americans and avoiding the abuses of the
past, we must remove all impediments to an effective intelligence capability for our
nation.” Still, in the face of a grave threat, the United States gave greater power to
agencies that would abuse their power, a trend that continues to this day.93
Perhaps the greatest shift in American foreign policy occurred in the arena of
military spending. Partly because of détente, the federal government had consistently
decreased the U.S. military budget in the years before Carter took office. Despite his
critics’ claim to the contrary, Carter increased military spending each year of his
presidency and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stimulated him to propose still further
spending.
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During his 1980 campaign, Carter outlined his history of military spending. He
stated, “We have not had a decrease, but a real increase in the readiness of the military
forces of this country in the last 3 ½ years. When I went into the Oval Office, for 8 years
prior to my Inauguration, 7 of those years we had an actual decrease in budgeted funds
going for military defense. Since I’ve been in office, every year above and beyond
inflation, in real dollars, we’ve had a steady, predictable, well-planned, orderly increase
in the commitment of budgeted funds to improve the military.”
In the same speech, he outlined his vision for the future of military spending,
claiming, “We have a commitment for the next 5 years, not just the last 3 years, to
continue this orderly increase every year in commitments for defense. It amounts to about
5 percent of our Nation’s gross national product, not excessive. I have no apology to
make for it. It’s a good investment.”
While Carter did propose an increase in military spending, he did not view such
an augmentation as a prelude to war. He saw it as a largely preventative action. He
maintained, “The best weapon is one that’s never fired in combat, and the best soldier is
one who never has to lay his life down or shed his blood on the field of battle.” Still,
Carter did not want America to appear the slightest bit vulnerable. In a rare expression of
machismo, he stated, “It’s also important that potential adversaries know that if they
attack the United States of America, that they will be committing suicide.” 94
Many experts largely credit Reagan’s stance on defense spending with his 1980
victory over Carter. In truth, Reagan did propose a seven percent increase in spending
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compared to Carter’s five percent. But this two percent difference hardly qualified Carter
as weak, as Reagan suggested. All jingoist rhetoric aside, the only major difference
between Carter’s and Reagan’s military spending in office were the B-1 bomber and the
SDI systems, both of which Carter did not support because he saw them as impractical,
not because he lacked a commitment to America’s defense. 95
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan changed American Cold War policy
in drastic ways, altering both foreign and domestic habits. The Carter administration was
forced to reconsider its thawing relationship with the Soviet Union, adopt new,
questionable allies, increase the power of government agencies both domestically and
abroad, and rearrange its spending habits, devoting more money to defense. These new
policies would remain intact until the end of the Cold War. While many observers credit
Ronald Reagan with implementing the changes, Jimmy Carter was the one who
suggested and employed the measures that would define American foreign policy for the
next decade. By the time he left office, Carter had more than a year to react to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and had used that year to solidify America’s stance for the final
phase of the Cold War.
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Chapter Four – Conclusion
Keeping the Peace
In his Inaugural Address, Carter expressed his desire for a world defined by
peace. He hoped that the hallmark of his foreign policy would be a peaceful coexistence
with the rest of the world, one that would survive to the next generation, and importantly,
one that also did not compromise American strength. A former military man, he wanted
his legacy to be one of peace.
Carter wanted peace but he wanted it on America’s terms. To secure American
interests, the United States had to be strong and dominant in world affairs. Such power
came with the possibility of abuse, against which Carter vowed to fight. In his 1980 State
of the Union Address, he confirmed, “I’m determined that the United States will remain
the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the
security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain
strong – a nation at peace in a stable world.” 96
Carter was successful in keeping America at relative peace while not sacrificing
vital American interests. His results were not without compromise, however. His idealism
in regards to human rights suffered in measurable ways.
In his Inaugural Address, he stated, “We can never be indifferent to the fate of
freedom elsewhere. Our commitment to human rights must be absolute.” Carter left
office still committed to the plight of human rights around the world. But in the interim,
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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced him to make some choices that favored
expediency over integrity. 97
Carter abandoned arms negotiation with the Soviets, heating up the Cold War. He
supported an oppressive regime in China and lent support to the nation of Pakistan which
was in the process of developing nuclear weapons. He opened the United States
government to secret intervention in the far corners of the world and increased its power
to collect intelligence domestically. He furthered the military industrial complex,
committing the United States to spending that would soon spiral out of control. Granted,
none of these actions individually bankrupted the United States’ morality. But taken
together, they show a president who favored practical but somewhat contentious solutions
rather than measures pious yet unrealistic, a president more cunning and hardnosed than
his critics suggest.
Perhaps that was just what the world needed. In his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote
about a conversation with Carter, “I commented that I understood his desire to go down
in history as a President Wilson but added that ‘before you are a President Wilson you
have to be for a few years a President Truman.’ By that I meant that the President had to
first convince the American public and the world of his toughness, and only then, during
his second term, could he adopt a more Wilsonian approach.” Carter desired an America
leading the world for the greater benefit of humanity, a country that stood up for
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righteousness rather than selfishness. But such a country can only lead if strong enough
to weather and tame the blows of other self-seeking nations. 98
While he may have sacrificed ideal conditions for a greater peace, something for
which he has been criticized even regarding his numerous post-presidency peace
missions, Carter did realize many successes in his response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Although it is doubtfully the sole work of Carter, the Soviet Union did not
venture into additional corners of the world, seemingly deterred and bogged down in
Afghanistan.
Unlike most modern presidents, Carter was able to establish closer ties with the
Islamic world. In the aftermath of the events in Iran and Afghanistan, Carter focused on
the similarities between the United States and Middle East, not the differences. He
claimed, “From the very beginning, the United States has enjoyed close and valued ties
with the Muslim world… I have been struck, personally and in my experience as
President, by the human and moral values which Americans as a people share with
Islam… Of course there is indignation among Americans today over events in one
Islamic country [Iran]. I share that indignation. But I can assure you that this just anger
will not be twisted into a false resentment against Islam or its faithful… We continue to
seek the closest possible political, economic, and cultural ties with the Islamic nations
and with Muslims throughout the world.” 99
Carter’s support of the Islamic world extended beyond rhetoric and beyond
strategic alliances with heads of state. He was naturally concerned with the plight of
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everyday citizens and pledged substantial money to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in
January 1980 and declared a week in July 1980 to be Afghanistan Relief Week, urging
Americans to support displaced Afghans.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan angered much of the rest of the Middle East,
turning nations that were neutral or conciliatory towards the Soviet Union against them.
The United States realized that, with any power shift, new diplomatic opportunities
presented themselves. Specifically, Brzezinski advised Carter, “The Afghanistan invasion
does give us some openings for a quiet dialogue with Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.” While
Iraq and Libya eventually became enemies of the United States, at the time they were in
danger of straying into the Soviet camp and this was prevented. 100
Carter’s support of the Islamic world was not without criticism. Even during the
famous Camp David peace talks, Carter was accused of catering to the Arab world and
interests at the expense of Israel. While Carter did not endorse either side over the other,
he showed much more respect to the Arab world than many of his contemporaries. He
even celebrated Islamic faith. While it differed from his brand of Christianity, he
respected all religions and their practitioners. 101
Carter’s successes with his response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
extended beyond the Middle East. As he sacrificed short term ideals, he hoped to
eventually bring about greater freedoms in East Europe and the Soviet Union itself. He
later claimed that his response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan allowed a
subsequent Polish uprising to take place without fear of reprisal. He stated, “I was
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convinced that the Soviets would already have moved into Poland if they had not been
bogged down in Afghanistan and condemned by most nations of the world for it.” 102
Indeed, Carter’s insistence on the implementation of the human rights provisions
of the Helsinki Accords is often credited with allowing many revolutionary groups in
Eastern Europe to thrive. Eventual Czech and Polish presidents Vaclav Havel and Lech
Walesa credited Carter with assisting their burgeoning movements that eventually
toppled the Communist Party in their countries. Perhaps Carter’s insistence on human
rights was respected by the Soviet Union because he stood up to them when they invaded
Afghanistan. While many other factors prevented the Soviet Union from cracking down
on such groups, Carter certainly aided the struggling movements.
Carter’s foreign policy, both while in office and as a subsequent peacemaker, has
been criticized for focusing too much on the big picture and not enough on the details. He
responds by claiming that peace talks cannot happen while bullets are flying. He once
said, “The Nuremberg trials could not have taken place while the Second World War was
raging.” In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he compromised on the details
in order to save the overall picture. He sacrificed short term human rights interests to
create a world more conducive to peace. He brought the nation “one major step short of
war” to produce a lasting peace. And in the end, although they were not swift enough to
earn him another four yeas in office, his policies saw America through to the end of the
Cold War. 103
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In a recent interview, Carter reflected on his years as president and concluded that
he had met his ultimate goal, leading the United States through turbulent times without
involving the country in war. He claimed, “In the end, I was thankful that although my
profession was that of a military man – commander in chief of the armed forces, prepared
to defend my nation with maximum force if I had to – I was able to go through my entire
term without firing a bullet, dropping a bomb, or launching a missile.” 104
Despite the turbulent times in which he served, Carter steered the nation clear
from war. His critics may have called him weak but, in the end, he was vindicated when
the Cold War ended without any direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Such a war would have been disastrous, as would a weakened United States that
buckled under the advance of the Soviet Union. Jimmy Carter was able to guide the
country between two extremes and through to a more peaceful world.
Historians who have been unkind to Carter perhaps do not grasp the entire picture.
The benefits of time and new materials paint a new portrait. His reaction to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan hardly portrays him as inept nor does it show a naïve newcomer
to Washington. His actions were swift and practical. Those who portray him as a wellintentioned but clumsy politician fail to see the depth of his vision for the long-term
future of foreign policy and his skill at enacting his plan. Those who see Carter as a
victim miss the big picture as well. Certainly he served in a volatile and trying time, but
he was hardly the victim of circumstances. Rather, when events began to spin out of
control, he managed the situation to realize his plan for the future. He did not suddenly
mature in the White House; he was simply forced to make the difficult choices he hoped
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would never come. Perhaps Carter can be criticized for sacrificing short term gains for
the future benefit of the world, but that is wholly consistent with his character as he has
always focused strictly on results.
Carter entered the White House with a vision for America’s future and when the
world outside his country’s borders shifted, he adjusted American foreign policy to the
world’s new reality and ushered in the changes that remained intact until the end of the
Cold War. While the subsequent Republican presidents receive the credit for managing
America’s role in the end of the Cold War, they were simply following the cue of Jimmy
Carter, a man much more committed to a just and peaceful future of the world than they.
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